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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the judiciary and the fields of administrative law
and civil procedure, a debate continues concerning the applica-
bility of the preclusion doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel' against the government. In general, the government
1. This Note will use the terms res judicata and collateral estoppel in their
traditional sense; namely to refer to the preclusion of relitigating previously decided
claims or issues. The terms preclusion, preclusion doctrines, or preclusion principles
will be used as an umbrella term encompassing both concepts. The classic statement of
the two related principles was set forth over a hundred years ago by the U.S. Supreme
Court:
In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be born in mind
... that there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or
estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or
demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same
parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the
judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy,
concluding parties and those in privity with them.
• . . But where the second action between the same parties is upon a
different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an
estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. In all cases,
therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered
upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of
action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated
and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated
and determined.
Cromwell v. County of SAC, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
Recent attempts to clarify these often confusing doctrines have apparently met
with little success. The most ambitious effort was put forth by the American Law
Institute with the compilation of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS in 1982.
Under the general rubric of preclusion, the Restatement sought to redefine res
judicata and collateral estoppel. If a claim is litigated and a valid and final judgment is
rendered on behalf of the plaintiff, that claim is said to be extinguished and merged in
the judgment (merger). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982). If a claim
is litigated and a valid and final judgment is rendered on behalf of the defendant, that
claim is said to be extinguished and the judgment bars subsequent litigation on the
same claim (bar). Id. at § 19. If an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and neces-
sary to a judgment, that determination is conclusive in subsequent litigation between
the parties on the same or different claim (issue preclusion) Id at § 27. The Restate-
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argues that it should have full use of these procedural doc-
trines, but that the role and function of the government suffi-
ciently distinguish it from private litigants such that the
preclusion doctrines should have no force against the govern-
ment.2 Conversely, others argue that the doctrines should be
applied uniformly against either private parties or the govern-
ment.3 As for the judiciary, the courts have failed to propound
any reasoned analytic approach for determining when the pre-
clusion doctrines may be applied against the government and
have instead vacillated between the two extremes on a case-by-
case analysis.4
This Note explores the issue of the applicability of the pre-
clusion doctrines against the government. Specific focus will
be placed upon the doctrines' application in cases where the
government has previously litigated a question of statutory
interpretation. The exploration begins with the recent case of
Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission5 (COark-Cowlitz), a classic factual setting
for analyzing this issue. The Note will then proceed to briefly
examine the historical developments of the preclusion doc-
trines and the United States Supreme Court's recent and con-
tinuing struggle with the application of the doctrines against
the government. It is the position of this Note that the Court's
struggle stems from a failure to analyze the doctrines within
the context of the conflicts between the policies served by the
application of preclusion doctrines and the policies and pur-
poses underlying government administration. From an analy-
ment uses the term res judicata broadly, as encompassing all three concepts. Id. at 131.
See also infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
2. It is a "long-standing policy of the United States government to look upon
repetitive litigation not only as permissible but as desirable. The government's policy
is supported by those cases in which, after a decade of relitigation in various circuits,
its position is vindicated." Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States
Government, 70 IowA L. REv. 112, 113-14 (1984). The government generally takes the
position that preclusion is inappropriate in either the criminal or civil context, and
that considerations such as mutuality and the fine distinctions between offensive and
defensive uses of estoppel are irrelevant. This position is based upon the view that
relitigation of decided issues and inter-circuit conflicts are valuable activities that lead
to a conclusive decision by the Supreme Court with the benefit of many reasoned
opinions by lower courts. Id. at 125 n.91 (referencing the Brief for Petitioner filed by
the United States in Mendoza v. United States, 464 U.S. 154 (1984)). See also infra
notes 141-150 and accompanying text.
3. Levin & Leeson, supra note 2, at 112 (discussing the views of the late Professor
Allan Vestal).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 73-126.
5. 775 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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sis of these competing policies, this Note will then propose a
functional standard for determining when the preclusion doc-
trines should be applied against the government to preclude
relitigating questions of statutory interpretation. Applying this
standard to the facts presented by Clark-Cowlitz demonstrates
that the holding of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, while ultimately correct, was flawed in its analysis.
A. C7ark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. FERC
The factual setting from which Clark-Cowlitz arose is com-
plex. At the center of the controversy is the interpretation of a
provision of the Federal Water Power Act, passed by Congress
in 1920.6 The Act, designed to promote the orderly develop-
ment of the nation's hydroelectric power potential,7 authorizes
the federal government to issue licenses for limited periods of
duration (usually 50 years) for the construction and operation
of dams on the nation's waterways.8
A key provision of the Act made public utility entities9
preferred applicants in the licensing process.'0 If a particular
hydroelectric generating site was sought by both a public and a
private utility," the Act provided that if the competing public
entity was "equally well adapted, to conserve and utilize in
the public interest the water resources,"' 2 then "the [Federal
Energy Regulatory] Commission shall give preference" to the
public utility in the issuance of the license.-3
During the 1970's, some of the initial licenses granted by
the federal government began to expire. Most of these original
licenses had been issued to private utilities. However, since the
1920's the number of public utilities within the country has
grown enormously.'4 Many of these public utilities were
6. 16 U.S.C. § 800 (1982).
7. See J. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-POWER LEGISLATION (1926). See also
Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC, 489 F.2d 1207, 1215-22 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
9. As used throughout this Note, the term public utilities refers to not-for-profit
electric utilities such as state, county, or municipal utility systems, including public
utility districts.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a) (1982).
11. As used throughout this Note, the term private utilities denotes investor
owned electric utilities, either publicly or privately held.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 800(a).
13. Id
14. AMERICAN PUBLIC POWER ASSOCIATION, CONSUMERS, COMPETITION AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE FOR PREFERENCE IN RELICENSING OF HYDROELECTRIC
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located adjacent to or had taken over private utility service ter-
ritories. Thus, as the old licenses expired, some public utilities
filed competing applications to become the new licensees of
existing hydroelectric projects held by private utilities. This
placed FERC in the position of having to determine whether
the Act's public preference provision applied to relicensing
proceedings.
In the mid-1970's, the public utility of Bountiful, Utah
filed the first competing application for a license held by a pri-
vate utility. Shortly thereafter, in 1976, the Clark and Cowlitz
Public Utility Districts (PUDs) of Washington formed a joint
operating agency for the express purpose of filing a competing
application for another existing project, the Merwin Dam,
located in southwestern Washington State. 5 The Merwin Dam
was originally constructed by a private utility pursuant to a 50
year license issued by the Federal Power Commission 6 in 1929,
and was scheduled for a relicensing in 1979.1'
FERC recognized the critical nature of the issue of
whether the Act's public utility preference provision applied to
relicensing as well as original licensing cases. In September of
1978, FERC announced the initiation of a generic proceeding to
resolve this issue of statutory interpretation by declaratory
order.'8 Because of the national implications of this issue,
intervention was sought by both the public and private utility
industry, en masse.19 In May, 1979, FERC granted the inter-
ventions and established a briefing schedule for the "resolution
of a purely legal issue, a question of statutory construction
which in no way hinges upon the facts of a particular case."20
Following the filing of briefs by all interested parties,
FERC conducted an unprecedented full day of oral argu-
ment.' Then, in June, 1980, FERC issued an order (hereinaf-
PROJECTS 10-13 (1983). Conversely, the number of private utilities has dropped from
approximately 4,000 in 1920 to about 200 today. Id. at 10.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Clark-Cowlitz.
16. The Federal Power Commission was the predecessor to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
17. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 368.
18. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Clark-Cowlitz.
19. Among the parties were the American Public Power Association, on behalf of
the nation's public utilities, and the Edison Electric Institute, on behalf of the nation's
private utilities.
20. Order Granting Interventions and Setting Briefing Schedule, No. EL78-43
(FERC May 3, 1979).
21. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 369.
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ter the Bountiful decision) declaring that preference did apply
in relicensing cases so long as the public utility applicant's
plans were first found "equally well adapted."22
Disappointed by FERC's Bountiful decision, the private
utilities appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.23
Approximately two years later, on September 17, 1982, the
Eleventh Circuit rendered its decision affirming FERC's inter-
pretation in the case of Alabama Power v. FERC.24 The Ala-
bama Power court held that FERC's interpretation of the Act,
that public utility preference applied in relicensing cases, was
"consistent with the statute's language, structure, scheme, and
available legislative history."'
Between the time of FERC's initial ruling in Bountiful
and the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance in Alabama Power, Pres-
ident Reagan was elected. Within the first two years of office,
President Reagan appointed four new members to the five
member FERC Commission.26 The new Commission members'
disdain for public utilities in general, and the Federal Water
Power Act's preference provision in particular, soon became
apparent.27 On April 25, 1983, the Commission met in secret
session 28 to assess available methods for reversing the Commis-
22. Opinion and Order Declaring Municipal Preference Applicable to
Hydroelectric Relicensings, 11 FERC 337 (June 27, 1980) reh'g denied, 12 FERC 179
(August 21, 1980).
23. Alabama Power v. FERC, 685 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1982).
24. Id. at 1318.
25. Id
26. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Clark-Cowlitz.
27. On September 14, 1983, at a public meeting, FERC Commission Chairman
Butler described the prior Commission's Bountiful decision and the Eleventh Circuit's
subsequent affirmance in the following terms: "As far as the legal merits are
concerned, it seems to me that there is no question. I almost choke over this Eleventh
Circuit claim that our legal position before them, and as we espoused in Opinion 88
[Bountiful] is defensible. I think it's indefensible." Brief for Petitioner at 26 n.11,
Clark-Cowlitz.
Five months earlier, on the day the administrative law judge rendered his opinion
in the Merwin Dam case, a spokesman for the FERC said, "[I]t is clear to me that they
[the Commission] may not affirm [the ruling of the administrative law judge]." Brief
for Petitioner at 18, Clark-Cowlitz. In a specific reference to the Bountiful decision of
the prior Commission, the spokesman stated, "[Tihat decision was made during the
Carter ... administration... this is a different Commission." Id.
28. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 369. This secret meeting, and FERC's subsequent
decision not to turn the minutes or transcripts of the meeting over to Clark-Cowlitz,
resulted in a companion piece of litigation under the Government In the Sunshine Act.
Clark-Cowlitz v. FERC, 775 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
FERC's decision at this meeting to attempt to reverse Bountiful resulted from
purely internal discussions between the staff and the Commission. No notice or
opportunity to comment was provided to any interested party. Furthermore, none of
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sion's prior ruling in the Bountiful decision.2"
Prior to the Commission's secret meeting, the actual Mer-
win Dam relicensing case was tried before an administrative
law judge. During this proceeding, the existing Merwin Dam
license holder, the Pacific Power and Light Company, con-
ceded that the Bountiful decision was controlling on the issue
of whether the Act's preference provision applied to the spe-
cific Merwin Dam case. ° At the conclusion of the Merwin
Dam proceeding, the administrative law judge ruled that
Clark-Cowlitz was as "equally well adapted" to operate the
project as the current private utility license holder; "prefer-
ence shall therefore be given, pursuant to section 7(a) of the
Act, to the application of [Clark-Cowlitz] and a license should
be issued to" Clark-Cowlitz."
When the administrative law judge's decision in the Mer-
win Dam case came before the FERC Commission, the Com-
mission chose to utilize this individual case as the vehicle for
reversing the statutory interpretation issue decided in Bounti-
ful.2 The Commission stated:
Today, in the perspective of this adversary relicensing
proceeding, we have come to the conclusion that Bountiful
was wrong and should be overruled. We believe that Bounti-
ful's conclusion was legally erroneous and that [public utili-
ties] have a relicensing preference against all adversary non-
preference applicants other than the "original licensees" in
possession [of the existing project] ....
The Commission also stated that "no legal impediment" to
overruling Bountiful existed. 4 It hinted that the Eleventh
the parties had requested such a ruling from FERC. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d 359 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
29. The Commission first chose to join with the private utilities in filing a request
for certiorari of the Alabama Power case with the Supreme Court. Clark-Cowlitz, 775
F.2d at 369. In his brief, the Solicitor General informed the Court of FERC's change in
position and requested that the case be remanded. The Solicitor General also stated
that "under traditional res judicata principles, if this court denies certiorari . . . [the
parties] may be bound by the Commissions order in any future relicensing
proceeding." Id at 369-70. Despite this request, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari in July, 1983. Utah Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 463 U.S. 1230
(1983).
30. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 370.
31. Brief for Petitioner at 16, Clark-Cowlitz.
32. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 370.
33. Opinion and Order Overruling Op. No. 88, Reversing Initial Decision and
Issuing New License to Original Licensee, 25 FERC 174 (Oct. 6, 1983).
34. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 370.
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Circuit may have been "misled" by the prior FERC Commis-
sion when it decided the Alabama Power case and, therefore,
its decision did not bind FERC 5
Clark-Cowlitz then filed suit against FERC in the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. Since Clark-Cowlitz
was one of the first entities to file a competing license in a
relicensing proceeding before FERC, Clark-Cowlitz was a
party in each of the proceedings designed to resolve the statu-
tory construction of the Act's preference provision. Clark-
Cowlitz appeared before FERC in the Bountiful case and
intervened as a defendant with FERC when the private utili-
ties challenged FERC's Bountiful holding in Alabama Power.3 6
Accordingly, Clark-Cowlitz's suit alleged, among other
things,37 that the preclusion doctrines of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel prevented FERC from reversing the previously
adjudicated question of statutory interpretation, at least as
against entities who were parties to the prior litigation, such as
Clark-Cowlitz."8
In its decision, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals first
noted the "[c]onfusion as to whether the problem involved is
one of res judicata (claim preclusion) or collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion) . . . ."" The court acknowledged that this
was the "understandable result of the unusual circumstances
of this case and the ambiguities in the doctrines themselves."4°
After analyzing the doctrines and some recent cases, the
court tentatively designated the issue as one of res judicata, as
opposed to collateral estoppel.41 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the "choice of label is of little import."42 Regard-
35. Id. The Commission also made clear that it fundamentally disagreed with the
policies embodied in the preference concept. The Commission stated that the
preference policy contained in the Act was a "conception of that era," and that its
relationship to the public interest is "considerably weaker today than in 1920." Brief
for Petitioner at 20, CMark-Cowlitz.
36. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 369, 375.
37. Clark-Cowlitz also challenged FERC's revised interpretation on its merits.
The court sustained Clark-Cowlitz's contention that the language of the Federal Water
Power Act and the legislative history supported application of the public utility
preference provision to relicensing as well as original license cases. Id. at 376-77.
38. Id. at 371 (Clark-Cowlitz actually plead res judicata, collateral estoppel, and
the "mandate rule"). See, e.g., Ithaca College v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.) cert
denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1980); City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d
344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also Brief for Petitioner at 25-31, Clark-Cowlitz.
39. Id. at 371.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 374.
42. Id.
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less of the label used, the court found that the situation
presented "a model for the application of preclusion
principles."4
In ruling for Clark-Cowlitz, and concluding that the gov-
ernment could be estopped from reversing the previously
decided question of statutory interpretation adjudicated in
Bountiful and Alabama Power, the majority focused on five
factors. First, in both Bountiful and Alabama Power, all par-
ties, including Clark-Cowlitz, had expended enormous energy
and resources in reliance upon FERC's assurances and intent
that that forum would conclusively determine the preference
question. Second, FERC had represented to the parties and to
the Eleventh Circuit that the issue was independent of and
unaffected by the facts in any individual relicensing case.
Third, the Solicitor General, on behalf of FERC, had indicated
to the Supreme Court his belief that a denial of certiorari in
Alabama Power would give binding effect to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision. Fourth, the parties in the present case were
parties in the prior proceedings, there had been little lapse of
time between the cases, and there was no material change in
the circumstances of the parties. Fifth, the facts were more
than "'virtually' the same"; they were identical.
44
Judge Wright wrote separately, concurring with the
majority in their construction of the statute and legislative his-
tory.45 He dissented, however, on the issue of whether res
judicata should be applied in this case.46 Judge Wright viewed
the case as posing a separate claim than the one initially
decided in Alabama Power. He stated:
The court [in Alabama Power] found that FERC's initial
interpretation was reasonable. Therefore, any challenge to
the reasonableness of that interpretation by the parties to
Bountiful would certainly be precluded. But Clark-Cowlitz
is not challenging the reasonableness of that initial interpre-
tation, it is challenging the Commission's revised interpreta-
tion. It may be difficult to imagine how two directly
opposite interpretations can both be reasonable, but saying
that the Commission's new interpretation is unreasonable is
different from saying that the Commission is precluded from
43. Id
44. d. at 375.




asserting it. 4 7
The majority's decision in Clark-Cowlitz is fundamentally
correct. However, as with most opinions that address the issue
of whether the rules of preclusion are appropriate for applica-
tion against the government, the majority's decision lacks the
force and clarity of a reasoned, workable approach. This short-
coming prevents the decision from having the impact that it
could have on future decisions that will address the same issue.
In light of the D.C. Circuit's decision to rehear the case en
banc,48 and the likelihood of appeal to the Supreme Court,
49
the opportunity to overcome these shortcomings may not yet
be lost.
B. Historical Perspective
In order to focus on the issue, it is appropriate to first
review the historical context in which the preclusion doctrines
developed. The concept of res judicata had its origins in early
Roman law50 while collateral estoppel originated in medieval
Germanic law.5' Although the two doctrines are conceptually
integrated, their divergent historical origins led to judicial and
academic attempts to keep them distinct.52 However, modern-
ized pleading practices have led to a recognition that the two
47. 1I at 382.
48. Id at 366.
49. The financial importance of the Merwin Dam to the parties and the
importance of the preclusion issue will likely result in an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
50. Adopting the principle that judicial decisions should be respected, Roman law
provided that prior decisions were conclusive in subsequent actions involving the same
legal basis and same central issue. W. BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK OF RoMAN LAW, 690-92
(1921); Comment, Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820
(1952) (hereinafter Developments); see also Perschbachaer, Rethinking Collateral
Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative Determinations in
Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 426 (1983) (hereinafter Rethinking
Collateral Estoppel).
51. Collateral estoppel was premised on the idea that because the parties
dominated the proceedings, their allegations at trial, subsequently proven, should
create an estoppel. While the principle was based on a party's own allegations or
conduct, a final judgment was required, leading to the terms "estoppel by record" or
"estoppel by judgment." Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata, 35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 44 (1940); Accord A. ENGELMANN, HISTORY OF
CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 149 (Millar Trans. 1927).
52. Developments, supra note 50, at 821. Some commentators argue that the
underlying purposes of the two doctrines remain distinct and that greater emphasis
should be placed on separating the two doctrines so as to not mistakenly apply one
doctrine on the basis of policies that are served by another. Rethinking Collateral
Estoppel, supra note 50, at 45-57.
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concepts are, in reality, related aspects of a single procedural
doctrine-preclusion."
During the last forty years, preclusion doctrines have been
significantly liberalized in their application.54 Much of this lib-
eralization resulted from an erosion of the ancient requirement
that there be mutuality of parties in both the prior and subse-
quent litigation in order for preclusion rules to apply.55 The
slow demise in judicial adherence to the mutuality require-
ment culminated with the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation6 and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.5 7
53. A. Englemann, supra note 51, at 149. See also supra note 1.
54. Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 423. The primary
motivational force behind this liberalization has been the burgeoning workload of the
judicial system. Id. at 425; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc., v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Courts and commentators have long recognized the
expediency and judicial economy that can be achieved through a more expansive
application of the rules of preclusion. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous
Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964);
Pharmadyne Laboratories v. Kennedy, 466 F. Supp. 100, 108 n.16 (D.N.J. 1979); Vestal,
Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial
Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV., 123, 143-46 (1977); Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 29, 31-33 (1964); Kelly & Rothenberg, The Use of Collateral Estoppel by a
Private Party in Suits Against Public' Agency Defendants, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 303,
304 (1980).
55. The mutuality requirement was historically called an "obviously just and
proper rule" based on the notion that a former judgment should have no bearing upon
one who had no part in the prior proceeding. Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J.
299, 301-304 (1929). Nonetheless, the mutuality requirement had been criticized for
over 150 years. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1831), an English philosopher who trained as a
lawyer but never practiced, wrote that mutuality was unfounded in reason, "a maxim
which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming table to the bench."
Zdanok, 327 F.2d at 954 (quoting 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONAL OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 578
(1827), reprinted in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Browning, ed. (1943)). This
passage is cited with approval by many cases that have addressed the mutuality
requirement. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942). Commentators have also
found Bentham's criticism equally persuasive. See also Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 n.5 (1957).
56. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Blonder-Tongue involved the relitigation of the validity of
a patent. A prior Supreme Court case, Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), had held
that mutuality was strictly required in cases involving the litigation of an alleged
infringement on a patent. The Court in Blonder-Tongue held that "Triplett should be
overruled to the extent it forecloses a plea of estoppel by one facing a charge of
infringement of a patent that has once been declared invalid." Blonder-Tongue, 402
U.S. at 349. Thus, the question remained whether the Court would abandon mutuality
in the context of other types of litigation.
57. 439 U.S. 322 (1978). In Parklane, a group of shareholders sought to estop
Parklane from relitigating the issue of whether the company issued materially
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In Blonder-Tongue, the Court adopted the "full and fair
opportunity to litigate" standard to determine whether a non-
party to the prior litigation should be permitted to invoke the
preclusion doctrines to prevent a party to the prior case from
relitigating an issue he had already lost."8 The "full and fair
opportunity" standard recognizes that there are two elements
essential to the analysis. Both elements focus on the person or
entity who had been a party to the prior litigation and against
whom the preclusion doctrines are subsequently asserted.
First, the fullness of the opportunity is determined by the
party's incentive to have vigorously litigated in the prior adju-
dication. 9 Second, the fairness element looks to the procedural
protections afforded the party in the prior litigation and
whether the subsequent case presents significant procedural
differences.60
In Parklane, the Court was faced with an attempted offen-
sive application of the preclusion doctrines by a non-party to
the prior litigation.61 Noting the academic and judicial criti-
cisms raised against the use of offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel,62 the Court concluded that the preferable approach
for determining whether to permit its application was to vest
broad discretion in the trial courts.6 3 However, in an effort to
misleading proxy statements, an issue which had been decided against the company in
a prior suit with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
58. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329. The "full and fair opportunity" standard was
adopted from prior circuit court opinions that had addressed and abandoned the
mutuality requirement.
59. Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 456 n.163.
60. Id
61. The Court stated:
[O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to
foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously
litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs
when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the
plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another defendant.
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 326 n.4 (quoted in United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n.4
(1984)).
62. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-31. These included the limited judicial economy that
results from offensive use; the potential disincentive for a possible plaintiff to join in
the initial action, since he could offensively make use of the prior adjudication if its
results were favorable to his case while at the same time escaping the results if they
proved unfavorable; and the potential unfairness that can result from the application
of the prior judgment in subsequent litigation if the likelihood of future litigation was
not foreseeable. Id. These concerns formed the basis for the Court's enunciation of
five factors which may warrant a refusal to apply nonmutual collateral estoppel. See
inkfra note 64 and accompanying text.
63. "We have concluded that the preferable approach for dealing with these
problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral
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guide the trial courts in their analysis, the Court in Parklane
set forth five factors which could warrant a refusal to apply
the rules of preclusion in a subsequent case. These factors
were when the party seeking to assert the prior judgment
could have easily joined in that action but chose not to; when
the defendant in the first action was sued for small or nominal
damages, particularly when the potential for future suits to
which the initial judgment could be applied was not foresee-
able; when the prior judgment is inconsistent with other judg-
ments in favor of the defendant; when the defendant is
afforded procedural opportunities in the second action that
were unavailable in the first; and finally, when there are
"other reasons" for denying the application of offensive non-
mutual collateral estoppel in the second suit.'
C. Application of Preclusion Doctrines Against
the Government
Historically, rules of preclusion were applied uniformly in
cases between private parties, and cases in which the govern-
ment was a party.' The first exception to this rule was carved
out by the Supreme Court in United States v. Moser.66 In
Moser, the government sought to avoid the effect of a prior
judgment by arguing that it should be free to relitigate ques-
tions of law, as opposed to questions of fact. The Court par-
tially agreed, and adopted an exception to the application of
preclusion principles for "unmixed questions of law."67
Even after Moser, the question of whether preclusion doc-
trines could be applied against the government on issues of
law, such as statutory interpretation, remained largely aca-
estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be
applied." Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.
64. 1& at 329-32.
65. Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 66 (1985).
66. 266 U.S. 236 (1924).
67. The Court stated:
. . . In a sense, . . . [the government's contention] is true. It [res judicata]
does not apply to unmixed questions of law. Where, for example, a court in
deciding a case has enunciated a rule of law, the parties in a subsequent action
upon a different demand are not estopped from insisting that the law is
otherwise, merely because the parties are the same in both cases. But a fact,
question, or right, distinctly adjudged in the original action cannot be disputed
in a subsequent action, even though the determination was reached upon an
erroneous application of the law.
Id. at 242 (emphasis in original).
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demic,6" as witnessed by the first Restatement of Judgments'
refusal to address the topic.69 This was primarily due to the
paucity of litigation on the matter.7 0 However, there has been
a recent series of Supreme Court cases that obliquely address
the issue, though none have contributed a viable standard or
approach for determining whether to apply the preclusion doc-
trines against the government on previously adjudicated ques-
tions of statutory interpretation.7 ' Nonetheless, these recent
cases provide an initial framework for analysis by placing the
issue in the perspective of competing public policies and
interests.72
In the first of the series, Montana v. United States,7 3 the
State of Montana sought to preclude the government from
relitigating whether a Montana tax on the gross receipts of
public, but not private, construction projects discriminated
against the federal government in violation of the Supremacy
Clause.74 In a prior decision, Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. State
Board of Equalization,5 the Montana Supreme Court had
ruled that the tax was constitutional. While not a party to that
case, the federal government had been significantly involved in
the dispute and exercised considerable control over the course
of the litigation.76
Inexplicably, the Court in Montana began its opinion with
an analysis of the mutuality requirement.7 7 Both the Blonder-
68. Hazard, Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's Interest, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 81, 90-93 (1984) [hereinafter Hazard].
69. The first RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS made no provisions for the application
of preclusion doctrines on issues of law. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 60 (1942).
70. Hazard, supra note 68, at 89.
71. See infra notes 73-126 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 127-150 and accompanying text.
73. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
74. Id. at 149-151.
75. 161 Mont. 140, 505 P.2d 102 (1973) (hereinafter Kiewit 1).
76. In Montana, the government stipulated that in the prior suit it had:
(1) required the Kiewit I lawsuit to be filed;
(2) reviewed and approved the complaint;
(3) paid the attorneys' fees and costs;
(4) directed the appeal from State District Court to the Montana
Supreme Court;
(5) appeared and submitted a brief as amicus in the Montana Supreme
Court;
(6) directed the filing of a notice of appeal to this Court; and
(7) effectuated Kiewit's abandonment of that appeal on advice of the
Solicitor General.
Montana, 440 U.S. at 155.
77. Id. at 153-55.
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Tongue and Parklane decisions preceded the Court's ruling in
Montana and had seemingly abandoned the mutuality require-
ment.7 8 Yet, with the exception of a passing reference to Park-
lane,79 neither opinion is discussed or distinguished in
Montana. ° Instead, the Court devotes considerable attention
to the mutuality issue and finds that while not a party to the
prior litigation, the government "plainly had a 'sufficient labor-
ing oar' in the conduct of the state-court litigation to actuate
the principles of estoppel."" l
In addition to the revival of a mutuality requirement, the
Montana Court set forth three further considerations. First
was whether the issues presented in the instant litigation were
"in substance" the same as those resolved in the prior adjudica-
tion."2 Second was "whether controlling facts or legal princi-
ples have changed significantly since the state-court
judgment." 3 Third was whether "other special circumstances"
existed to warrant a refusal to apply the rules of preclusion .
4
Finding for Montana in each instance, the Court held that the
government was precluded from relitigating the constitutional
question resolved in the state court action.
8 5
Following the Court's decision in Parklane, and the unex-
plained rebirth of mutuality in Montana, there remained the
question of whether nonmutual collateral estoppel could be
invoked against the government, either offensively or defen-
sively. The Supreme Court's first opportunity to address this
issue arose in a criminal case Standefer v. United States."6
Standefer was charged with aiding and abetting a federal offi-
cial accused of taking bribes." However, in a prior adjudica-
tion, the federal official had been acquitted of the bribery
charge."8 Since the government was unable to establish the
existence of a bribe beyond a reasonable doubt in the prior
case, Standefer now sought to preclude the government from
78. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
79. The Court merely used Parklane as a reference for the traditional definition
of mutuality. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153.
80. Id. at 153-64.





86. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
87. Id, at 11-12.
88. Id. at 14.
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prosecuting him for aiding and abetting a bribe.8 9
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger implied
that nonmutual collateral estoppel could, in some instances, be
applied against the government, but that it would be inappro-
priate to do so in this case.90 Utilizing the "full and fair oppor-
tunity" test established in Blonder-Tongue, the Chief Justice
found that significant differences were presented in the crimi-
nal context that were absent in civil cases.9" Chief among
these differences was that criminal cases involve "the impor-
tant.., interest in the enforcement of the criminal law." 92
The Court's opinion in Standefer created mixed results in
the circuit courts.93 By injecting a new "important public
interest" factor, the court opened the door to a case-by-case
search for countervailing public interests that could serve to
defeat the application of the rules of preclusion.94
The Court's next opportunity to espouse a definitive test
for determining when to permit the application of preclusion
doctrines against the government was in Nevada v. United
States.95 In Nevada, the federal government sought to secure
additional water rights to the Truckee River on behalf of the
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation.96 Sixty years earlier the
government had initiated a suit on behalf of the same tribe and
89. Id.
90. Id. at 23-24.
91. Id. at 22-24.
92. Id at 24.
93. See infra cases cited note 94.
94. By relying upon the "full and fair opportunity" test, the Court implied that
nonmutual collateral estoppel could be applied against the government, at least in a
civil case. Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral
Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 43 (1985). See infra note 95. See also Mendoza v.
United States, 672 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (finding no
"critical" need for redetermining the issue adjudicated previously and thus permitting
the application of preclusion against the government). See infra notes 119-31 and
accompanying text. Accord Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981) (finding that the case raised important public issues and a
general public interest in all government litigation, thus refusing to apply preclusion);
American Medical Int'l, Inc. v. Secretary of HEW, 677 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the
chilling effect that application of nonmutual estoppel against the government would
have on the development of issues of federal law makes it inappropriate); Luben
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 707 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply
nonmutual estoppel against the government after application of the "full and fair
opportunity" test); Western Oil & Gas Ass'n. v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980)
(applying Blonder-Tongue and Parklane factors and finding application of preclusion
rules against the government inappropriate).
95. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
96. Id. at 113.
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a reclamation project against all other Truckee River water
users with the intent of conclusively resolving various parties'
right to the river. 7 In Nevada, the government sought to char-
acterize the prior litigation as involving a claim for water for
irrigation purposes only.98 The government alleged that the
present suit involved a claim for water for fisheries purposes
and was, therefore, a separate and distinct claim, not barred by
the preclusion doctrines.99
In analyzing whether the prior litigation involved the
same cause of action as that presented in Nevada, the Court
relied heavily upon the intent of the government in the prior
case. Having intended to adjudicate all rights and claims to the
waters of the Truckee River in the prior litigation, the govern-
ment, the Court held, could not now attempt to circumvent
that earlier ruling by attempting to characterize the current
proceeding as one involving a specific claim not addressed in
the initial litigation. 00 In other words, the Court refused to
reward artful pleading.
The two most recent pronouncements by the Supreme
Court on the issue of the applicability of preclusion rules
against the government were decided on the same day in early
1984.101 In United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 10 2 the Court
permitted the application of "mutual defensive collateral
estoppel" against the government on a question of statutory
interpretation. 10 3 In the prior litigation in the Tenth Circuit,'
°4
Stauffer successfully asserted that private contractors under
contract with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
were not "authorized representatives" under the Clean Air
Act.'0 5 As such, Stauffer prevented the private contractors
from conducting an inspection of a Stauffer facility in Wyo-
ming when the private contractors refused to sign an agree-
ment not to disclose trade secrets discovered during their
inspection. 0 6 When the EPA again sought to use private con-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 119, 121.
99. Id.
100. Id at 132-34.
101. Both cases were decided on January 10, 1984. See infra notes 102 and 114.
102. 464 U.S. 165 (1984).
103. Id
104. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981).
105. Id. at 1079 (interpreting § 114 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(2)
(1982)).
106. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. EPA, 647 F.2d at 1079.
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tractors to inspect a Stauffer facility in Tennessee, Stauffer
again refused and the EPA brought the present action.0 7
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, relied on the
four-part test established in Montana.'08 He found that the
first three requirements were easily met: mutuality of parties,
issue identity, and the lack of any changes in the controlling
facts or legal principles.'0 9 As to the fourth, whether there
were "any special circumstances warranting an exception to
the otherwise applicable rules of preclusion," the Court
focused on the potential applicability of the "unmixed ques-
tions of law" exception"0 first announced in Moser."' Noting
that the doctrine was conceptually troublesome and "difficult
to delineate,""' 2 the Court nonetheless found "no reason to
apply it here to allow the Government to litigate twice with
the same party an issue arising in both cases from virtually
identical facts.""1
3
The companion case to Stauffer was United States v. Men-
doza." '4 Mendoza sought to assert offensive nonmutual collat-
eral estoppel against the government on a constitutional
question"' previously decided against the government. 6 In a
resounding retreat from the current trend toward liberalizing
the applicability of the rules of preclusion, the Court held that
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel could not be applied
against the government, at least to "preclude relitigation of
issues such as those involved in this case.""11
7
The Court's opinion in Mendoza is significant in a number
107. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. at 167-68.
108. Id. at 169-173. See supra text accompanying notes 77-84.
109. Id. at 169.
110. Id. at 170-73.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67.
112. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. at 170 (quoting Montana, 440
U.S. at 163).
113. Id. at 172.
114. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
115. The question was whether the government's administration of § 701 of the
Nationality Act during a nine-month period in the Philippines following the end of
World War II had violated Mendoza's due process rights. The Act provided that
noncitizens who served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States during
World War II were exempt from some of the requirements for citizenship. For a nine-
month period following the end of the War, the United States had no Immigration and
Naturalization Service agent available in the Philippines. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 156-57.
116. In re Naturalization of 68 Filipiho War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (The government did not appeal this decision). For a summary of this case, see
Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 157 n.2.
117. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162.
19871
318 University of Puget Sound Law Review
of respects. First, extending the distinctions espoused in
Standefer,11" the Court noted that certain factors distinguish
the federal government from private litigants. The Court cited
two particular differences in the nature of the government as
litigant as opposed to private parties: The jurisdictional multi-
plicity that results from the geographic breadth of the govern-
ment; and the special nature of the issues the government
litigates and their collective importance to the citizenry. 119
Because of these factors, the government "is more likely than
any private party to be involved in lawsuits against different
parties which nonetheless involve the same legal issues."120
Second, the Court concurred with the government's concern
that nonmutual collateral estoppel could "substantially thwart
the development of important questions of law by freezing the
first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue. '"121
Third, the Court found that permitting nonmutual collateral
estoppel would force significant revisions in the Supreme
Court's appellate procedures and in the policies and practices
of the Solicitor General.'22 The Supreme Court would have to
grant government petitions for certiorari far more often in
order to free the government from far-ranging estoppel effects
of individual cases.123 The Solicitor General would have to
forego or strongly de-emphasize the institutional concerns
relating to limited government litigation resources and
crowded court dockets, and replace those with concerns
regarding the binding effects of prior decisions.'24
Unfortunately, Mendoza left unsettled the question of
whether nonmutual collateral estoppel could be applied
against the government. This uncertainty stems from the
Court's use of conflicting language in its holding, 2 ' its failure
118. 447 U.S. 10 (1980). See also supra text accompanying notes 91 and 92.
119. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159-60.
120. Id, at 160.
121. Id. The Court noted that it benefited from receiving input from several
courts of appeals before it explored difficult questions. See also infra notes 141-45 and
accompanying text.
122. Id. at 160-61.
123. Id. at 160 (citing Sup. CT. R. 17.1).
124. Id. at 160-61.
125. For example, at one point the Court flatly states that "nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel is not to be extended to the United States [government]." Mendoza,
464 U.S. at 158. However, the Court later states that "nonmutual offensive collateral
estoppel simply does not apply against the government in such a way as to preclude
relitigation of issues such as those involved in this case." Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
Thus, the court implied that nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel may possibly be
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to specifically require mutuality, and its unwillingness to over-
rule or distinguish its prior holding in Standefer, which
implied that nonmutual collateral estoppel could appropriately
be applied against the government, at least in some
instances.1 2 6
The Court's holding in Mendoza can be criticized for its
apparent inability or unwillingness to espouse a substantive
test for determining when the preclusion doctrines can be
applied against the government. Nevertheless, the Court con-
tributed to a proper analysis of the issue by examining the con-
flict between the underlying policies and purposes of
government administration and the policies served by the
application of the preclusion doctrines. It is only within the
context of these competing policies that any reasoned approach
can be developed for determining when the rules of preclusion
can be applied against the government.
D. The Policies Underlying Preclusion Doctrines And Their
Conflict With The Purposes of Government
Administration
The application of the rules of preclusion in subsequent
litigation is said to rest on the policies of (1) protecting litigants
from the expense and vexation of repeated litigation;127 (2)
protecting courts from the burdens of repetitious and unneces-
sary litigation;128 (3) promoting respect, deference, and confi-
dence in the judicial process and the finality of judicial
determinations;129 (4) avoiding the confusion and embarrass-
ment of inconsistent and conflicting judicial results;13 0 and (5)
assisting in the general peace and repose of society.'
31
applied against the government and that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel might
be applicable under certain situations.
126. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
127. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 158 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980));
Parklane, 430 U.S. at 326; Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29; Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d
at 373. See, also Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 425; Vestal,
Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 29, 34 (1964). See generally Moschzisker,
Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929).
128. See supra note 127.
129. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129; Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d
at 373. See generally Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1036 (1971);
Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Demise of Mutuality, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 724 (1967).
130. Mendoza, 440 U.S. at 158 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. at 94);
Montana, 440 U.S. at 154; Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 373. See also Developments, supra
note 50 at 820.
131. Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129 (quoting Southern Pacific Railroad v. United States,
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The applicability and force with which these policies come
into play in any particular litigation vary depending upon the
type of preclusion being asserted (e.g., mutual or nonmutual)
and the context in which the prior and subsequent litigation is
presented. 3 2 For example, collateral estoppel, by definition,
has minimal impacts on the policies of preventing the expense
and vexation of repeated litigation, protecting the courts from
repetitious litigation, and aiding in the finality of judgments.133
First, the parties are already in court in the subsequent litiga-
tion, although on a different claim or demand.'" Second, the
court will have to hear and address arguments over whether
collateral estoppel should apply, as well as any other issues or
claims outside the scope of the potential estoppel.135 Third,
because the estoppel will only prevent a relitigation of an issue
or issues, the actual judgment in the second case could still be
inconsistent with a prior adjudication if, for example, the out-
come of the second case turns on a matter not previously
addressed in the prior litigation.3 6
Offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel presents even
weaker supporting policies.137 Because the party against whom
the estoppel is asserted will undoubtedly desire to resist its
invocation, and because he is the only party who has previously
litigated the issue, he is unlikely to be concerned with
whatever expense and vexation may be caused by subsequent
relitigation of the issue.'38
A completely different set of policies and purposes are
involved when the government seeks to relitigate a previously
decided issue. These policies center around the purposes and
functions of the government and its unique position with
respect to private litigants. 3 9 While the government, as any
party, must follow established laws, it is also responsible for
168 U.S. 1, 49 (1897)). See also Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 373. See generally
Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929).
132. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
134. Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 449.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Parklane, 439 U.S. at 329-30.
138. See supra note 137.
139. Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 447-48; Mendoza, 464 U.S. at
159-62; United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1984). See also
infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10:301
Precluding Government Relitigation
creating, implementing, and administering the law.140
When the government is a party in litigation involving an
issue of law, such as statutory interpretation, the primary pol-
icy concern when applying the rules of preclusion against the
government is said to be the effect such application would have
on the development of the law.1 4 1 Courts142 and commenta-
tors14 3 have consistently expressed the concern that preclusion
doctrines developed for private conflict litigation should not be
used so as to freeze or retard the development of the law. This
is particularly so where the issue of law under consideration is
part of an administrative or regulatory act, and the govern-
ment is responsible for its implementation."44 The need for
flexibility and adaptability to adjust to changing social, eco-
nomic, political, or technical needs is perceived by many to be a
necessary element in the government's administration of the
laws.
1 4 5
Relitigation of issues is also said to be an essential and
beneficial element of our judicial system. Having numerous
courts address a particular issue of national significance results
in the "percolation" of an issue. The issue can then be authori-
tatively determined by the Supreme Court with the benefit of
the thoughts and analysis of many lower courts.146 In fact, this
percolation process often serves as the basis for a grant of cer-
tiorari by the Supreme Court because the Court typically waits
for inter-circuit conflicts before addressing an issue. 47 Thus,
there is often an incentive for the government to seek relitiga-
tion of an issue in order to create a decisional conflict and
thereby attract the attention of the Supreme Court.
Another policy concern is the general public importance of
many of the issues the government litigates and the number of
140. For a general discussion of the administrative law and governmental
functions and particular instances of conflicts between the government's role as
administrator of the law and the duty to obey the law, see generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (5th ed. 1973).
141. See infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
142. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160; Montana, 440 U.S. at 162-63. Cf. United States v.
Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. at 173.
143. Rethinking Collateral Estoppel, supra note 50, at 451-55. See generally
Hazard, supra note 68.
144. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159-61. Accord American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison,
387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967) ("flexibility and adaptability to changing needs and patterns
... is an essential part of the office of a regulatory agency.").
145. See supra note 144.
146. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
147. Levin & Leeson, supra note 2, at 118.
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cases in which the government is involved.14 The need for
continuing judicial scrutiny of prior determinations in today's
changing society and the potential harm that can result from
an erroneous opinion favors at least an occasional judicial
revisitation of prior decisions.149
Because of these concerns the government generally takes
the position that rules of preclusion are simply inapplicable
against the government.150 Relitigation should not only be per-
mitted, the government argues, it should in many instances be
encouraged.
On the other hand, permitting the government to reliti-
gate previously decided issues raises separation of powers and
delegation doctrine questions. For example, if Congress has
passed a statute and delegated its administration to a depart-
ment of the executive branch, and the interpretation of that
statute has been previously adjudicated, for all practical pur-
poses, the law is settled. The relitigation could result in a stat-
utory interpretation which differs from, if not totally reverses,
the prior interpretation. Permitting the government to reliti-
gate the interpretation of the statute, as opposed to having
Congress amend or repeal the law, implicitly authorizes legis-
lating by the courts and administrative agencies.
Furthermore, permitting relitigation by the government
may have a chilling effect upon the activities of those who
must act in reliance upon certain statutes and their interpreta-
tion. If a party knows that a statutory interpretation resulting
from an administrative proceeding or judicial action will not
necessarily be binding in the future, two things may occur.
First, parties will probably be less likely to devote the atten-
tion and resources that they would otherwise devote in an
administrative or judicial proceeding designed to interpret the
statute. Second, a party will be hesitant to make significant
capital and labor investments in reliance upon a statutory
interpretation.
It is against the backdrop of these competing policies that
a reasoned approach to the application of the preclusion doc-
trines against the government must be developed. On the one
148. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
149. Id. This is especially true in the arena of constitutional questions. Vestal,
Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflicts, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial
Policies, 55 N.C.L. REV. 123, 178 (1977).
150. See supra note 2.
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hand are the policies favoring judicial finality, economy, con-
clusiveness, the prevention of litigious harassment, and the
separation of powers and proper delegation of legislative func-
tions. On the other are the policies favoring governmental
flexibility and adaptability in order to implement and adminis-
ter the law in a changing political, social, technical, and eco-
nomic society.
E. Synthesizing a Workable Approach
As a starting point, the four-part test established in Mon-
tana serves as a sturdy foundation upon which to model a
workable approach. 5' However, additional factors must be
added into the analysis in order to accommodate the competing
policies and interests underlying the preclusion doctrines and
government administration.
The first step of the proposed test addresses mutuality.5 2
Both the Standefer and Mendoza decisions articulate and
demonstrate the unique role and function of the government
in litigation.'53 These factors justify the requirement that the
government be bound by prior litigation only with respect to
the actual parties or their privies. A requirement of mutuality
is further supported by the diminished force of the policies
favoring the application of preclusion doctrines when a non-
party to the prior adjudication seeks to preclude relitigation.' 4
Furthermore, requiring mutuality lessens the concern that
development of the law will be frozen or thwarted since the
government will still be free to relitigate a claim or issue
against new parties. 5 This in turn can result in the beneficial
"percolation" of an issue through continuing analysis by vari-
ous courts, which can then be addressed by the Supreme
Court. 5 6
The second element of the proposed test examines
whether the claim or issue being presented is in substance the
151. See supra text accompanying notes 77-84.
152. Montana, 440 U.S. at 154-55.
153. See supra notes 91-92 and 119-124 and accompanying text. Of particular
relevance to the application of preclusion rules is the public importance of the issues
the government litigates and the number of cases in which the government is involved.
A decision in one case, for example, a welfare benefits case, if applied nationally or
even within one circuit because of the preclusion doctrines, could have far reaching
economic and social effects.
154. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
155. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 163-64.
156. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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same as that previously litigated." 7 Modern pleading practices
broadly define the terms "claim" or "issue."158 In addition, art-
ful pleading and subtle characterizations can conceivably result
in an even broader preclusive effect of prior decisions.5 9 Yet
neither of these liberalizing forces finds strong support in the
policies underlying the application of preclusion doctrines."6°
Conversely, the factors that distinguish the government from
private litigants16  support a careful circumscription of the
issue or claim allegedly precluded from being relitigated. Such
an approach already exists within the field of administrative
law. 6
2
In addition to carefully defining the claim or issue previ-
ously litigated, reference should also be made to the govern-
ment's intent in the prior adjudication. Such an approach
serves a purpose similar to equitable estoppel if, for example,
the government intended a conclusive resolution of the partic-
ular claim or issue in the prior suit. 63 This factor was utilized
by the Supreme Court in Nevada when it precluded the gov-
ernment from attempting to characterize the subsequent litiga-
tion as involving a claim not previously adjudicated."8
Focusing on the government's intent in the prior litigation
satisfies a number of policy concerns on both sides of the pre-
clusion equation. First, if the government indicates a desire to
resolve a matter of statutory interpretation, the parties in that
proceeding will generally act in reliance upon that intent, both
in the resources they devote to the proceeding itself and the
capital and labor they invest subsequent to the interpretation.
Second, holding the government to its expressed intent pro-
157. Montana, 440 U.S. at 155.
158. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 327; Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by
Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1724 (1968).
159. Such an attempt was made by the government in Nevada when it attempted
to characterize the subsequent litigation as involving a claim not previously
adjudicated. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 180-
81 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
162. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS notes that the jurisdiction of
administrative agencies is often closely circumscribed and argues that this
jurisdictional limitation should carry with it a correspondingly narrow definition of
claim or issue for the purpose of determining the application of preclusion doctrines.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83 comment g (1982).
163. Asimov, Estoppel Against the Government: The Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 4 (1975).
164. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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motes respect and confidence in the prior judicial determina-
tion and in the government itself. Third, such a rule would
induce the government to more carefully consider and coordi-
nate its litigation strategies in light of its administrative needs
and the purposes of its administrative proceedings.
The third leg of the proposed test looks to whether there
has been any "significant change" in the controlling facts or
legal principles. 6 5 The mere passage of time alone should not
be sufficient to defeat the application of the rules of preclu-
sion.166 Whether a change in government administrations
should be a basis for refusing to apply the preclusion doctrines
is a more difficult question. One can argue that a change in
administrations is a manifestation of new political choices
which should be reflected in permitting administrative and
judicial revisitation of prior decisions. Yet such an argument
begs the question of who should be allowed to legislate. Fur-
thermore, why should a change in administrations be viewed
as a "controlling fact"? The better view is that an administra-
tive change should not be a sufficient reason, in and of itself, to
refuse to apply preclusion doctrines.1 67 However, if there has
been a substantial change in the political, social, technical, or
economic climate in conjunction with a change in administra-
tions, relitigation may be warranted, particularly in the arena
of constitutional questions. 68
The fourth and final element of the test is whether "spe-
cial circumstances" exist which warrant denying preclusive
effects to a prior judgment.16 9 The Blonder-Tongue "full and
fair opportunity to litigate" standard provides a helpful ana-
lytic structure to this inquiry by giving some definition and
direction. Thus, the analysis would initially focus on the prior
litigation and the government's incentive to have vigorously lit-
igated, as well as the procedural opportunities and protections
that were afforded. 7 ' This focus can be sharpened by incorpo-
rating the five factors cited in Parklane as reasons for denying
the application of preclusion doctrines to prior judgments,' 7 '
165. Montana, 440 U.S. at 155.
166. See, e.g., Nevada, 463 U.S. at 110 (where 60 years had passed between the
prior litigation and the government's subsequent attempt to relitigate).
167. United States v. Ortiz, 176 U.S. 422 (1900); 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law
§ 532 (1972).
168. American Trucking Ass'n. v. Atchison, 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
169. Montana, 440 U.S. at 155.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
171. See supra text accompanying note 64.
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an approach which has been successfully applied in numerous
district and circuit court cases. 72 Finally, if there is a clear
need for judicial revisitation of a prior decision because of
harmful impacts of that judgment on the public or individuals
who were not parties, or because it was not foreseeable that
the issue would arise in a substantially different context, then
courts should deny the application of preclusion principles
against the government.
173
It also should be noted that one circumstance occasionally
discussed by the courts as a conceivable basis for refusing to
apply preclusion doctrines, the "unmixed questions of law"
doctrine, should be abolished and removed from consideration.
The doctrine, as first enunciated in Moser, beyond its obvious
problems of characterization and manipulation, has proved too
conceptually difficult to continue as a viable tool of analysis.1 74
F. Application to Clark-Cowlitz
Applying the approach described above to C7ark-Cowlitz
demonstrates that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reached
the correct result. However, the reasoning of the court was
flawed in that it failed to base its decision upon a proper analy-
sis of the underlying policies and purposes of the preclusion
doctrines and government administration.
In the context of the first requirement, mutuality, Clark-
172. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965)
(small claim in trial from which there was no appeal did not support the application of
collateral estoppel in second action for much larger claim); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d
801 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (lack of procedural opportunities in administrative hearing
prevented the application of preclusion in subsequent trial); Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v.
General Dynamics Corp., 512 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Mass. 1981) (limited discovery, biased
tribunal, and restricted opportunity to present evidence justify failure to apply
preclusion doctrines); Sierra Club v. Alexander, 484 F. Supp. 455 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (de
minimus amount of claim in first action meant little incentive to litigate vigorously);
Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1980) (differences in burden of proof in first
and second action make issues different); Haung Tang v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 523 F.2d
811 (9th Cir. 1975) (preclusion not appropriate because of differences in procedures
between foreign court which initially decided the issue); Butler v. Stover Bros.
Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1977) (defendant had been barred from testifying in
wrongful death action by virtue of state dead man's statute, but was permitted to
testify in present action, thus making preclusion inappropriate).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982).
174. United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. at 171-72 ("(W]e are frank to
admit uncertainty as to its application .... Admittedly, the purpose underlying the
exception for 'unmixed questions of law' in successive actions on unrelated claims is




Cowlitz presents some conceptual difficulty. While both Clark-
Cowlitz and FERC were parties in the prior litigation, they
were aligned on the same side.175 Some courts have held that
adversarial mutuality is required in order for preclusion princi-
ples to be applicable. lv However, adopting this principle in
cases involving the government would often defeat the pur-
poses of the preclusion doctrines. For example, suppose that a
statute is subject to two contradictory interpretations, as was
the case in C7ark-Cowlitz. 7v If the government adopted an
interpretation opposed by party A, but supported by party B,
and party A then litigated the issue with the government and
lost (the government's interpretation being upheld), party A
would not seek to estop the government from subsequently
reversing its interpretation since the government would then
be adopting the interpretation supported by party A. As to
party B, who supported the government's initial interpretation
and presumably intervened on the side of the government in
the first suit, party B would be unable to preclude the govern-
ment from reversing its interpretation since party B would not
have been an adversary of the government in the prior litiga-
tion. Thus, the government would be free to shift back and
forth between contradictory statutory interpretations without
being bound by any previous adjudication.
The better view is to not require adversarial mutuality in
order to preclude the government from relitigating previously
adjudicated questions of statutory interpretation. 78 The Clark-
Cowlitz court implicitly adopted this approach when it focused
merely on the mutuality of the parties without regard to their
alignments or alliances in the prior proceeding.179
The second step of the analysis, identification of the issue
or claim previously litigated, also poses conceptual difficulties
in this case. On the one hand, Clark-Cowlitz can be character-
ized as a relitigation of the issue of whether preference applies
in relicensing cases, an interpretation apparently adopted by
the majority. 8 0 On the other hand, it can be viewed as a
totally separate cause of action litigating the reasonableness of
175. C7ark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 366.
176. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 278 (8th Cir. 1979); Scooper Dooper, Inc. v.
Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1974).
177. CMark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 366.
178. See supra text accompanying note 177.
179. Clark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 383.
180. Id. at 376.
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the current interpretation, a view adopted by Judge Wright.181
The problems inherent in the approach espoused by Judge
Wright are similar to those that would flow from a require-
ment of adversarial mutuality. By Judge Wright's definition,
any governmental attempt to revise or reverse a previously
adjudicated statutory interpretation would involve a challenge
to the new interpretation and thus be free from the effects of
the preclusion doctrines. Such an approach also would raise
questions of administrative or judicial legislating 8 2 and have a
chilling effect upon the resource decisions of interested
parties. 83
The proper approach to defining the scope of the claim or
issue previously adjudicated is to examine the intent of the
government in the initial proceeding.' 4 In its own administra-
tive proceedings, and in its presentation before the Eleventh
Circuit in Alabama Power, FERC clearly indicated that it
intended a conclusive and final determination of the applicabil-
ity of the public utility preference clause in relicensing cases.'8 5
In light of this intent and the parties' reliance on it, the gov-
ernment should not now be able to escape the application of
preclusion doctrines by contending that the prior interpreta-
tion is of no moment, and that Clark-Cowlitz merely concerns
the reasonableness of FERC's current interpretation. 8 6
The third part of the analysis asks whether there has been
any significant change in the controlling facts or legal princi-
ples. The only apparent change between Bountiful and Clark-
Cowlitz was the addition of new members to the FERC Com-
mission who politically disagreed with the prior Commission. 8 7
As discussed previously, such an administrative change is an
insufficient basis to warrant a refusal to apply the preclusion
doctrines. 88 Furthermore, as noted by the court in Clark-Cow-
litz, FERC itself indicated that the resolution of the statute's
construction involved "a purely legal issue, . . .which in no
way hinges upon the facts of a particular case."189
181. Id at 383.
182. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
185. Ciark-Cowlitz, 775 F.2d at 369, 375.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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The fourth part of the analysis, a combination of the "full
and fair opportunity to litigate" standard and the "special cir-
cumstances" exception, also fails to uncover a basis for refus-
ing to apply the preclusion doctrines. First, FERC's incentive
to litigate in Alabama Power was strong inasmuch as FERC
indicated the ultimate decision would be binding in all future
relicensing cases."9 Second, FERC was neither burdened by
any procedural disadvantages in Alabama Power nor provided
additional procedural opportunities in Clark-Cowlitz. 9 Third,
none of the "special circumstances" exists which would call for
denying preclusive effect to the decision in Alabama Power.92
II. CONCLUSION
While the holding of the majority in Clark-Cowlitz was
correct, the analysis of the court was flawed. The case
presented "a model for the application of preclusion princi-
ples," yet the court failed to respond in kind by presenting a
cogent test that could serve courts in the future that are
presented with the same issue.
The D.C. Circuit (and the Supreme Court if they hear the
case) should rise above the piece-meal, case-by-case approach
previously applied by courts to cases that address the question
of whether preclusion doctrines should be applied against the
government. Instead, the court should explore the issue on the
basis of the underlying policies and interests involved. As pro-
posed in this Note, such an analysis can provide a workable
model upon which to evaluate the applicability of the ancient
doctrines of preclusion to the modern and changing field of
government litigation and administration.
Bradley Bishop Jones
190. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Clark-Cowlitz.
191. It has been argued that the government is "an experienced litigant" in all
federal forums and thus "suffers no handicap in any Case I forum." For this reason,
some have argued that factors such as the initiative in choosing the forum, whether
the government is a defendant or plaintiff, competency of counsel, and foreseeability
of future suits are all inappropriate considerations when the government is involved.
Kelly & Rothenberg, The Use of Collateral Estoppel By a Private Party in Suits
Against Public Agency Defendants, 13 U. MICH. L. REV. 303, 316 (1980).
192. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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